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Abstract
How do movements and coalitions which engage with multiple social issues succeed in cross-
issue solidarity, and when do they instead become fragmented? To address this, the mechanisms
of cross-issue interaction have to be understood. Prior work on opinion dynamics and political
disagreement has focused on single-issue consensus and polarization. Inspired by practices of
cross-issue movement building, we have developed a general model of multi-issue opinion dy-
namics where agreement on one issue can promote greater inclusivity in discussing other issues,
thereby avoiding the pitfalls of exclusivist interaction, where individuals engage only if they
agree sufficiently on every issue considered. Our model shows that as more issues come into
play, consensus and solidarity can only be maintained if inclusivity towards differing positions
is increased. We further investigate whether greater inclusivity and compromise across issues
lead people towards or away from normative truth, thereby addressing concerns about the non-
ideal nature of political consensus.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of rising populism in liberal democracies, and a spate of unexpected electoral out-
comes in the United States and the United Kingdom, a flurry of commentary has emerged, linking
the cause of these political upheavals to increasing polarization and fragmentation.1–3 While con-
cerns about fragmentation are not new, and have been diagnosed as a problem for both left-wing
and right-wing coalitions,4–6 recent criticism in the US has been directed at the purported divisive-
ness of leftist identity politics, as well as the related practice of cross-issue intersectional activism.7
Critics of these practices charge that they cause fragmentation by simultaneously tackling mul-
tiple social issues, which they believe creates more room for disagreement.8–10 Defenders argue
instead that they are necessary to engender change that is genuinely inclusive.11–13 Underlying
these arguments are different premises about the dynamics of political disagreement when multi-
ple issues are involved — does fragmentation become more likely as more issues are involved, or
can cross-issue interaction instead give rise to solidarity and consensus?
One approach to addressing this question is through opinion dynamics, an inter-disciplinary
field that has attracted the likes of physicists, mathematicians, and engineers. Numerous models
and applications have been developed in connection with opinion dynamics,14–18 and some of its
predictions have been validated by theory and experimentation in social psychology.19–22 While
the mathematical approach of opinion dynamics necessarily reduces the complex semantics of
opinions to either numbers23–25 or yes/no variables,26 the phenomena captured by these models
are still of great richness and diversity, ranging from consensus formation27 to rumour spread-
ing28–30 and innovation diffusion.31 Of prominence are the bounded confidence models of opinion
dynamics, which stipulate that agents only consider the opinions of others if those opinions are
close enough to their own — i.e., their confidence is bounded. Such models were first developed
by Hegselmann and Krause,23 as well as Deffuant and Weisbuch,24, 25 and they are notable because
they readily demonstrate the emergence of political polarization and fragmentation under the as-
sumption of bounded confidence. Their psychological basis can be found in social judgement
theory (SJT), which predicts that people’s opinions move closer together only if they fall within
each others’ ‘latitude of acceptance’.19, 32
Although many variations upon bounded confidence dynamics have since been developed,
they have primarily been limited to how opinions on a single issue evolve.33 Crucial to our present
investigation, however, is the role of cross-issue interaction. Such interactions can be highly signif-
icant and warrant detailed investigation — single-issue models predict that sharp disagreement
on one issue will lead to disengagement between individuals, but this neglects the possibility that
they might still hear each other out because they share some other belief. Conversely, it may
be that two individuals are unable to come to terms on an issue that they mostly agree about,
simply because they sharply disagree on some other issue that drives a wedge between them.
Of the limited work that has been done on multi-issue opinion dynamics, some studies have ex-
tended the concept of one-dimensional latitudes of acceptance into n-dimensional “spheres”,33
addressed cases where opinions are about appropriate budget allocations,34, 35 or focused on how
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agreement on one issue might induce tolerance (but not agreement) on others.36 Other work, while
not concerned with cross-issue interaction directly, has taken such interaction into account while
explaining phenomena like the difference between perceived and actual levels of political polar-
ization.37 The rich potential of cross-issue interactions, where similarity along one issue might
promote agreement along another, remains under-explored.
In contrast to previous approaches, the present study seeks to develop models which help
elucidate the conditions under which cross-issue mobilization leads to either consensus or frag-
mentation, an investigation that bears directly upon the debates discussed earlier. In doing so,
we address the following two questions of relevance: Firstly, how does increasing the number of
issues affect the likelihood of cross-issue consensus, and how might cohesion be maintained re-
gardless? Secondly, given that a common worry about consensus across political divides is that it
may simply lead to false compromises, and that the space of ‘correct opinions’ may grow increas-
ingly small as more issues come into play, what is the relationship between pursuing cross-issue
consensus and ensuring convergence to normative truth?
To answer these questions, we developed different possible models of cross-issue interaction.
Some of these were less inclusive, in that individuals would only engage if they agreed suffi-
ciently on all considered issues, while others were more inclusive, in that agreement on a single
issue would increase tolerance for disagreement on others. The effects of such inclusivity upon
consensus were explored in tandem with the effects of the number of issues. To investigate the
relationship between truth convergence and consensus, we modified the forgoing models to incor-
porate interactions between individuals and the truth, and also considered the role of the truth’s
extremity. In doing so, we have produced comprehensive models which capture the collective
effects of these factors upon cross-issue solidarity and truth convergence.
2 Models of opinion dynamics
We first introduce some notation before showing the development of our models from previous
work. Consider a group of n individuals, where each individual i holds opinions on m different
issues. These opinions are represented as a vector xi of length m, where the kth-dimensional
component of the vector (i.e. i’s opinion on the kth issue) is given by a real number xik.
Each component xki is assumed to lie within a finite range, say [0, 1]. That is, the most extreme
position in support of a particular issue is assigned a value of 1, and the most extreme position
against it is assigned a value of 0. For each dimension k, we also define the population opinion
vector, xk := (x1k, x
2
k, ..., x
n
k ), which contains all the group’s opinions on the kth issue. Opinions
evolve with time, so we denote the opinion vector at time t as xk(t). When m = 1, we omit the
subscript and write x(t) ≡ x1(t).
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2.1 Bounded confidence in a single dimension
To account for the limited acceptance of other opinions and the possibility of polarization pre-
dicted by social judgement theory, we build on the bounded confidence model first proposed by
Hegselmann & Krause (2002).23 In bounded confidence models, individuals only give considera-
tion to others who share opinions sufficiently similar to their own. After each round of discussion,
some individuals who used to interact with each other may find that their opinions are now too
far apart, and begin to ignore each other. Predictably, these dynamics result in polarization if
individuals only take into consideration opinions that are very similar to their own.
Formally, the model is defined by assigning each individual i a neighborhood of acceptance
I(i, x). This neighborhood contains all individuals with sufficiently similar opinions
I(i, x) := {j : |xj − xi| ≤ } (1)
where  is called the latitude of acceptance. Each individual updates their opinion simply by
averaging over all the opinions which fall within the neighborhood of acceptance, giving us
xi(t+ 1) = |I(i, x)|−1
∑
j∈I(i,x)
xj(t) (2)
Here, |I(i, x)| denotes the number of individuals inside I(i, x).
2.2 Bounded confidence in multiple dimensions
We proceed to extend the above model into multiple dimensions, thereby accounting for the pos-
sibility of interaction between opinions on several issues. We start with the case where issues are
completely independent and do not influence each other. Following that, we draw upon differ-
ing practices of multi-issue advocacy and movement building to present some possible modes of
cross-issue interaction.
The first of these is exclusivist interaction, where individuals only engage with others if they
agree sufficiently on all issues under consideration. The second is inclusivist interaction, where
individuals engage with others as long as they agree sufficiently on at least one issue under con-
sideration. We then present a general model of cross-issue interaction which interpolates between
these two extremes using a parameter we term the degree of inclusivity.
Independent issues
The most straightforward extension to multiple dimensions is to treat all issues as independent, i.e.,
opinions on different issues do not influence each other at all. For each dimension k, we thus have
the same dynamics as before:
Ik(i, x) := {j : |xjk − xik| ≤ k} (3)
xik(t+ 1) = |Ik(i, x)|−1
∑
j∈Ik(i,x)
xjk(t) (4)
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Ik(i, x) and k are respectively the neighborhood and latitude of acceptance in dimension k, 1 ≤
k ≤ m. Since the dynamics in each dimension can be analyzed separately, results from the one-
dimensional case carry over.
Exclusivist interaction
Opinions and beliefs are rarely completely independent. Instead, they often influence one another,
and our perceptions of others’ beliefs. What happens if two individuals largely agree on one
issue, but disagree sharply on another? One possibility is that they refuse to engage with each
other. Though seemingly close-minded, there are circumstances under which most would find
this reasonable. For example, if a vegetarian meets an animal lover who also happens to endorse
slavery, most of us would think the vegetarian justified in refusing engagement, despite whatever
gains they might make for the cause of animal rights by befriending the pro-slavery animal lover.
This mode of cross-issue interaction can be described as exclusivist in character, because each
individual only gives weight to others if their opinions are sufficiently close in all dimensions,
and excludes everyone else. We can thus define the neighborhood of acceptance I∩(i, x), and the
corresponding update rule:
I∩(i, x) := {j : |xjk − xik| ≤ k for all k} (5)
xik(t+ 1) = |I∩(i, x)|−1
∑
j∈I∩(i,x)
xjk(t) (6)
Note that I∩(i, x) = ∩mk=1Ik(i, x). That is, I∩(i, x) is the intersection of all the neighborhoods
Ik(i, x) defined in the model with independent issues. Given the exclusivity of these dynamics, it
is expected the chances for multi-issue consensus will decrease as more issues come under consid-
eration, with opinions fragmenting into large numbers of non-interacting clusters instead.
Inclusivist interaction
Returning to the scenario where two individuals are in agreement on some issues but not others,
the obvious alternative is for them to continue engaging despite their disagreements. In the most
extreme case, they would engage so long there is at least one issue upon which they agree. This
might occur, for example, if the belief agreed upon is something fundamental to both of their social
identities, such as religion or a commitment to one’s nation, leading to willingness to compromise
on other issues. Alternatively, such compromise could just be strategic – both individuals might
decide they stand more to gain from engaging on the issue where they share similar opinions,
even though this might mean letting go of their disagreements on other issues.
Since this mode of cross-issue interaction emphasizes inclusion in dialogue despite disagree-
ment, it can be described as inclusivist in character. The neighborhood of acceptance I∪(i, x) and
the corresponding update rule are defined as
I∪(i, x) := {j : there exists k where |xjk − xik| ≤ k} (7)
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xik(t+ 1) = |I∪(i, x)|−1
∑
j∈I∪(i,x)
xjk(t) (8)
Note that I∪(i, x) = ∪mk=1Ik(i, x). That is, I∪(i, x) is the union of all the neighborhoods Ik(i, x).
Naturally, we might expect these dynamics to have a greater chance of multi-issue consensus than
the exclusivist case, and to maintain a high chance of consensus even when the number of issues
increases.
Generalized inclusivity
Neither the exclusivist nor inclusivist mode of interaction completely captures the complexity of
cross-issue interactions. In general, it is reasonable to suppose that agreement on one issue will
only foster agreement on another issue to a limited extent. To that end, we can define a model
that interpolates between the two extremes. Intuitively speaking, the general model says that if
individuals agree sufficiently on one issue, they become more tolerant of disagreements on other
issues. For example, if someone loves classical music but hates pop, they might give consideration
to the opinions of a fellow classical music lover who is slightly more fond of pop music, as opposed
to the opinions of someone who is similarly fond of pop, but does not like classical music at all.
A more algorithmic explanation is as follows. During each round of discussion, an individual
first checks to see if an interlocutor’s opinion is within their latitude of acceptance k for at least
one issue k. If this is true, they then have an expanded latitude of acceptance αkl for every other
issue l 6= k, where αk ≥ 1 is a factor called the degree of inclusivity. If, for each of these issues l 6= k,
the opinions held by the interlocutor are within the expanded latitude of acceptance (i.e. |xjl −
xil| ≤ αkl for all l 6= k), the individual will give their interlocutor some weight of consideration.
Following this mechanism, we can define the neighborhood of acceptance and the corresponding
update rule:
I∗k(i, x) := {j : |xjk − xik| ≤ k and |xjl − xil| ≤ αkl for all l 6= k} (9)
I∗(i, x) :=
m⋃
k=1
I∗k(i, x) (10)
xik(t+ 1) = |I∗(i, x)|−1
∑
j∈I∗(i,x)
xjk(t) (11)
Here, I∗k(i, x) corresponds to the expanded neighborhood of acceptance of an individual i for all
opinions that fall within the latitude of acceptance for the kth issue (i.e., all xj where |xjk−xik| ≤ k).
Since we have one expanded neighborhood for each issue k, we take the union of all of them to
obtain the overall neighborhood of acceptance, I∗(i, x).
The role played by αk is crucial for the generality of this model. It can be understood as the
degree by which agreement on the kth issue makes one more inclusive of differences on all other
issues. If we set αk = 1 for all k, then all issues are minimally inclusive with respect to each other,
and we get the exclusivist model described earlier. But if we set αk =∞ for all k, this is maximally
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inclusive, and we get the inclusivist model from before. A prediction that follows is that the
degree of consensus should increase with the values of αk, while opinion fragmentation decreases.
Depending on how large αk is, the degree of consensus may decrease with the number of issues (as
predicted for the exclusivist case), or it may be maintained (as predicted for the inclusivist case).
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the models described thus far. In each sub-figure,
the plus sign marks the position of an individual in two-dimensional opinion space, with x1 and
x2 denoting opinions on the first and second issues respectively. Dashed lines surround the neigh-
borhoods of acceptance for the marked individual. Figure 1a shows the neighborhood in the one-
dimensional case — i.e. when individuals only consider the first issue during interactions. Any
opinion within the vertical strip is acceptable, because it falls within 1 = 0.1 of the individual’s
opinion on issue 1. Figure 1b depicts the exclusivist case, which has a rectangular neighborhood
because opinions have to fall within k of all issues k = 1, 2 to be acceptable. Figure 1c depicts the
inclusivist case. The neighborhood is a cross which extends to the borders of the opinion space,
because falling within k for either issue k is acceptable. Figure 1d shows the general case when
α1 = α2 = 2.5. It should be noted that this neighborhood interpolates between the extremes of
inclusivity and exclusivity, appearing as cross with limited bar-span along each dimension.
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Figure 1: Neighborhoods of acceptance (dashed boundaries) about the point (0.3, 0.4), with latitudes of ac-
ceptance k = 0.1 for all k, and αk = 2.5 for all k in (d). The number of dimensions m = 1 in (a), but the
second dimension is plotted for ease of comparison.
2.3 Dynamics in the presence of truth
A common worry about political compromise is that the consensus reached may not be ideal or
true, i.e. the result of a fallacious “authority of the many” or “argument to moderation” rather
than careful reasoning.38, 39 This can be used as justification against inclusive dialogue or consen-
sus, because if a party strongly believes that they are in the right, they might also believe that it
is better to stand one’s ground than let go of what they view as the truth. Such behavior is espe-
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cially pertinent in the context of multi-issue deliberation, because with more issues to “stand one’s
ground” upon, fragmentation is even more likely to occur.
However, is it necessarily the case that consensus will lead people away from the truth? Here
we propose an extension to the above models that allows this question to be investigated. Suppose
that for each issue k, there does in fact exist a “correct opinion” or “normative truth” T , with the
coordinates xk = Tk. Suppose also that individuals close in opinion to the truth will discover or
interact with it in some way, perhaps by investigating the world or thinking more deeply about
the issue. An elegant way to include this in a bounded confidence model of opinion dynamics is
to model the truth as as a virtual ‘individual’ x0 with a fixed location in opinion space, x0 ≡ T =
(T1, ..., Tm). This ‘individual’ x0 ≡ T never changes its position, but all individuals nearby to T
in opinion space will include it in their neighborhoods of acceptance. They will therefore update
their opinions in response to the truth, and if there are no other individuals pulling them in the
opposite direction, their opinions will eventually converge towards T , resulting in consensus that
is also true.
Undoubtedly, such a desired result will not always occur, depending on how inclusive or ex-
clusive people are, and how many people’s opinions are initially situated close to the truth. We
investigated the conditions under which convergence towards the truth occurs by varying the
parameters of the models described above, the results of which are presented below.
3 Methods
The models described above were implemented in MATLAB R2017 (MathWorks). At every time
step, the transition matrix for each opinion dimension was calculated as a function of the popu-
lation’s opinions (represented as a matrix), and then used to compute the population’s opinions
in the next time step. The number of final opinion clusters was computed using the unique func-
tion in MATLAB, thereby extracting the distinct points in the opinion space to which opinions
eventually converged. Convergence to the truth was determined by checking whether an individ-
ual’s opinion was within δ = 0.025 of the truth’s location by the final time step of each simulation
(exact convergence to the truth is not possible because the truth’s location is fixed). In determin-
ing aggregate trends, all simulations were repeated at least 100 times, with the results averaged.
The generality of these trends were corroborated by analytical derivations, which are included in
Section 1.1 of the Supplementary Information.
4 Results
4.1 Effects of inclusivity and dimensionality on consensus
Each of the multi-dimensional models described above was simulated with the same latitudes of
acceptance k, in order to investigate their respective propensities towards consensus or fragmen-
tation. Figures 2 to 5 below show sample runs for each model when the number of issues was
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m = 2, with the initial opinions were distributed uniformly at random over the space of possible
opinions. m = 2 was chosen to allow visualization of the evolution of opinions over time.
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Figure 2: Evolution of opinions when issues are independent, resulting in 12 final clusters. (a) and (b) show
the evolution of x1 and x2 respectively, (c) shows the trace in both dimensions, and (d) shows the evolution
of both over time. Simulation parameters used were n = 200, m = 2, and k = 0.1 for all k.
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Figure 3: Evolution of opinions under exclusivist interaction, resulting in 16 final clusters. (a) shows the
trace in both dimensions, and (b) shows the evolution over time. Simulation parameters used were n = 200,
m = 2, and k = 0.1 for all k.
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Figure 4: Evolution of opinions under inclusivist interaction, resulting in 1 final cluster. (a) shows the trace in
both dimensions, and (b) shows the evolution over time. Simulation parameters used were n = 200, m = 2,
and k = 0.1 for all k.
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Figure 5: Evolution of opinions under the general model of inclusivity, resulting in 4 final clusters. (a) shows
the trace in both dimensions, and (b) shows the evolution over time. Simulation parameters used were
n = 200, m = 2, k = 0.1 for all k, and αk = 2.5 for all k.
The case where issues are independent from each other is depicted in Figure 2. As can be seen
from Figures 2(a) and (b), opinions on each issue evolve independently and converge to several
non-interacting clusters, such that in two dimensions, the clusters form a rectangular lattice. The
total number of opinion clusters (= 12) is hence just the product of the number of clusters for
each issue (3 and 4 for the first and second issue respectively). As a result, even though opinion
fragmentation for each issue is limited, when both issues are considered together, fragmentation
is much more severe. This can be seen in Figures 2(c) and (d).
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of opinions under exclusivist and inclusivist interaction
respectively. As expected from the smaller neighborhoods of acceptance, fragmentation is severe
in the exclusivist case, with 16 final clusters emerging, and no lattice arrangement present as in the
independent case. This lack of regular structure is because issues are no longer considered inde-
pendently, and so if fragmentation emerges, it emerges across all issues simultaneously (vice versa
for consensus). For the inclusivist case, fragmentation is non-existent – total consensus emerges
very rapidly instead, in line with the large neighborhoods of acceptance.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of opinions under generalized inclusivity, with degree of inclu-
sivity αk set to 2.5 for all k. Four non-interacting opinion clusters emerge. As expected, this lies
between the two extremes generated by the exclusivist and inclusivist scenarios. Again it can be
seen that the clusters are not arranged in a lattice. Rather, because fragmentation occurs across
both issues at once, there is some correlation between an individual’s final opinion on the first
issue and the seccond issue. For example, if individuals are far to the left on the first issue, they
are more likely to be in the larger bottom-left cluster in Figure 5(a), and thus are more likely to be
near the bottom on the second issue.
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To better quantify the effect of inclusivity and dimensionality upon consensus and polariza-
tion, the average number of final opinion clusters nc was computed via simulation for a range
of dimensions and degrees of inclusivity. The number of clusters nc is used as a measure of the
degree of opinion fragmentation (correspondingly, an inverse measure of the degree of consen-
sus). The results of these simulations are shown in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 6. All other
parameters were kept constant at the following values: n = 1000 agents, T = 50 timesteps, a
constant latitude of acceptance k = 0.1 for all dimensions. For each simulation, the degree of
inclusivity was equal across all dimensions (αk = α for all dimensions k), and for each degree of
inclusivity α and dimension m, the data was averaged over 100 trials. It is important to note that
α = 1.0 (bolded in Table 1) corresponds to exclusivism, and that α = 10 (also bold) corresponds to
inclusivism (because when k = 0.1, α = 10 has the same effect as α =∞).
Dimensions, m
Inclusivity α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.0 3.9 14.21 61.61 441.93 872.8 976.7 995.95 999.09 999.89 999.97
2.5 3.9 2.71 1.92 1.58 3.41 17.38 94.92 318.48 634.71 850.02
3.25 3.9 1.01 1 1 1 1.13 2.57 11.41 39.21 113.27
4.0 3.9 1 1 1 1 1 1.02 1.11 1.74 3.72
4.75 3.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.03 1.01
5.5 3.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7.0 3.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8.5 3.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 3.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Effect of inclusivity and dimensionality on the number of clusters nc after T = 50 timesteps. Other
parameters were n = 1000, k = 0.1 for all k. Results were averaged over 100 trials.
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Figure 6: Effect of inclusivity and dimensionality on the number of clusters nc after T = 50 timesteps. For
α ≥ 4.5, nc was equal or very close to 1 for all m ≥ 2, and hence the trend lines appear to overlap.
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In general, it can be seen that the degree of fragmentation increases as the number of issues
m increases, but decreases as the degree of inclusivity α increases. Both of these trends are as
predicted. Furthermore, as m increases, the value to which α has to reach to maintain absolute
consensus (nc = 1) also increases. In other words, greater inclusivity is required to ensure solidar-
ity and cohesion in cross-issue interactions as more issues come under consideration.
A minor deviation from these general trends is that for α > 1.0, the number of clusters drops
from m = 1 to m = 2. This is simply because α has no effect in the one-dimensional case, but
expands the neighborhood of acceptance for all m ≥ 2. Thus, the amount of fragmentation is
constant for m = 1 regardless of α, but decreases with alpha once m ≥ 2.
Interestingly, with the given parameters, there is a point at which greater inclusivity brings no
further consensus — when α = 4.75, consensus is effectively ensured for up tom = 10 dimensions,
and larger values of α show minimal improvement (though they might show more improvement
when m grows even larger). This is a promising result for the promotion of cross-issue solidarity,
because it suggests that a limited amount of inclusivity is enough for cohesion in practical contexts
where the number of issues is not arbitrarily high.
A similar kind of saturation also occurs with the degree of opinion fragmentation. This effect
is most clearly seen in the exclusivist case (α = 1.0). As m increases, nc eventually reaches the
maximum of n = 1000 – i.e., just about every individual is isolated in a non-interacting cluster. This
extreme amount of fragmentation is because agreement on too many issues has to occur before
these exclusivist individuals interact with one another. Clearly, exclusivism should be avoided by
those who wish to promote cross-issue cohesion.
To further validate the trends described, analytical derivations were also performed to de-
termine the likelihood of consensus as a function of α. In accordance with our simulations, the
two-agent likelihood of consensus increases with m when α is high, and decreases when α is low.
Indeed, when  = 0.1, there is a threshold of inclusivity α∗ = 5 above which the likelihood of
consensus always increases with m. This somewhat counter-intuitive result readily explains the
observation that consensus seems to saturate when α ≥ 4.75. Full details of these derivations can
be found in the Supplementary Information.
4.2 Effects of inclusivity on convergence to the truth
Another set of simulations was performed to investigate the dynamics of opinion evolution in
the presence of truth, modelled as a virtual agent with opinion T . Given that the extremity of
the truth with respect to the average person’s opinion might influence the degree of convergence
toward the truth, three scenarios were considered — central truth (close to the average opinion),
moderate truth (somewhat removed from the average opinion), and extreme truth (distant from
the average opinion). Since the opinions of the simulated population were initially distributed
uniformly at random across the opinion space [0, 1]m (hence having an expected average opinion
of (0.5×m), i.e. 0.5 repeated m times), we chose the values of T = (0.45×m), (0.30×m), (0.15×m) to
correspond to the respective scenarios.
14
These scenarios were simulated for both m = 2 and m = 3 dimensions, and with varying
degrees of inclusivity α. All simulations were run for T = 100 timesteps, and used a smaller
number of n = 50 individuals to avoid “drowning out” the truth. (Recall that the truth has the
influence of a single individual in our model, though a simple modification of the model can allow
this influence to be weighted stronger or weaker instead.) For each simulation, the number of final
opinion clusters nc was recorded, as was the fraction of the population that eventually converged
to the truth, fT . The results for each set of parameters were averaged over 100 trials.
Figure 7 shows two sample runs for each of the three scenarios when m = 2, with the first
sample run simulated with α = 2.5 (low inclusivity) and the second sample run simulated with
α = 7.0 (high inclusivity). In line with the results presented earlier, a higher degree of inclusivity
results in greater consensus. Greater consensus, however, does not always coincide with a greater
degree of convergence to the truth (as measured by fT ). Instead, convergence to the truth depends
on both how extreme the truth is, and the degree of inclusivity α.
Under high inclusivity (α = 7.0), most of the population converges to the truth if it is central.
This is because in the absence of truth, the expected point of consensus is at the initial average
opinion x¯ (in this case, the center of the opinion space), which is near the truth. As can be seen
in Figure 7b, the population rapidly converges towards x¯. Following that, the population slowly
approaches the truth. These dynamics occur because the influence of the truth is relatively small,
and can hence only exert so much pull on the rest of the population. Nonetheless, the truth T is
within the neighborhood of acceptance of x¯, and so the population converges to it after a while.
On the other hand, if the truth is more extreme, it will fall outside the neighborhood of acceptance
of x¯, such that under high inclusivity, the population does not converge to the truth at all. This can
be seen in Figures 7d and 7f. Rapid convergence towards x¯ still occurs, which means that even
individuals initially close to T end up moving away so quickly that they are hardly influenced by
the truth at all. Once they move away, T is no longer within their neighborhood of acceptance,
and so they never converge to the truth.
When inclusivity is low (α = 2.5), the dynamics are markedly different. Given a central truth
(Figure 7a), the fraction that converges toward it is much smaller than the high inclusivity case.
This is because individuals with initially extreme opinions end up converging to extreme clusters
instead, and hence are too far from the truth to “listen” to it. While this might seem like a negative
outcome, it is precisely this potential to form extreme clusters that allows for convergence to more
extreme truths. As shown in Figures 7c and 7e, significant fractions of the population still converge
to truth when it is moderate or extreme, a sharp contrast to the high inclusivity case, where the
entire population ignores more extreme truths. It can also be seen that smaller clusters converge
more rapidly to the truth (compare for e.g. Figures 7e and 7b). This is because the truth has greater
relative influence over smaller groups of individuals, whereas in large clusters, it has to compete
with the voices of a lot more individuals — a counterintuitive benefit of opinion fragmentation.
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Figure 7: Evolution of opinions under varying inclusivity and extremity of truth, where the z axis is time.
The trace of the truth T is depicted by a red dashed line. For all simulations shown, n = 50, T = 100, m = 2,
and k = 0.1 for all k.
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Figure 8: Effects of inclusivity and truth extremity on the fraction that converges to the truth fT and the
number of clusters nc after T = 100 timesteps. Other parameters were n = 50, k = 0.1 for all k. Results
were averaged over 100 trials.
Figure 8 shows the aggregate results for the effects of inclusivity and truth extremity for m = 2
and 3 issues, demonstrating that trends described above hold more generally. As Figures 8a and
8c show, fT , the fraction that converges to the truth, increases with α when the truth is central.
When the truth is moderate or extreme however, fT first increases then peaks at a lower value of
α, before dropping close to zero and remaining there for α ≥ 4.75. Both overly high and overly
low α result in lack of convergence to the truth, but for different reasons. The case of high inclu-
sivity has been described. For overly low inclusivity, lack of truth convergence is due to the large
degree of fragmentation, such that even if some fragments end up close enough to T to converge
towards it, their size is still very small. Between these two extremes, there is a ‘sweet spot’ where
fT is maximal. At this point, inclusivity is low enough to prevent groupthink (i.e. fallacious con-
sensus at the average opinion), but high enough that large fragments of the population eventually
converge to the truth.
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In most cases, a more extreme truth results in smaller fT , regardless of α. This is to be expected,
because less individuals are close to truth when it is further from the center of the initial opinion
distribution, and so less individuals end up converging towards it. On the other hand, Figures 8b
and 8d show that truth extremity has minimal impact on the degree of fragmentation, as measured
by nc. In agreement with the previous section’s results, nc drops rapidly to 1 as α increases. The
effects of dimensionality are also similar — there is higher fragmentation (higher nc) for m = 3,
which in turn explains the lower fT for m = 3 when the truth is not central.
5 Discussion and conclusion
As hypothesized in our presentation of the models, the results show that greater inclusivity leads
to a higher degree of cohesion and consensus, whereas a greater number of issues increases the
degree of fragmentation. While this is a straightforward enough result, it formalizes an important
insight for actors in the public sphere who wish to promote cross-issue solidarity. As more issues
come under collective debate, the risk of disagreement increases, and in order to mitigate this risk,
participants in the conversation have to also increase their degree of inclusivity.
On this note, it is crucial to distinguish between ‘inclusivity’ as we have quantified it here,
and the slightly different concept of ‘open-mindedness’. Open-mindedness can be understood as
the general willingness to listen to dissimilar viewpoints, and in bounded-confidence models, it
is captured by , the latitude of acceptance. Inclusivity, on the other hand, is one’s willingness to
hear another out when already in agreement on something else, and is captured in our models by α.
Becoming more inclusive is thus, psychologically speaking, a lower bar. It does not require greater
acceptance of arbitrary opinions, only the opinions of those with whom one already shares some-
thing in common. This matters, because while it may be difficult to increase the open-mindedness
of the average person, encouraging inclusivity towards those already in partial agreement is likely
to be considerably easier.
How might inclusivity be encouraged? One possibility is to simply raise awareness about how
unrealistic it is to expect simultaneous agreement on more than a few issues, and how insisting
upon such agreement (i.e. engaging in exclusivist interaction) can lead to severe fragmentation.
Returning to the motivating example of intersectional activism, it is just this potential for fragmen-
tation that critics often lament.8, 10 By formalizing and demonstrating the effects of exclusivism,
the results presented here may aid in dissuading such practices. Instead, our results offer the inclu-
sivist mode of interaction as a more productive alternative for multi-issue dialogue. As defenders
of intersectional movements argue, inclusivity is what such movements look like at their best —
they ‘draw people in’ rather than ‘call people out’, using shared commitments to promote further
dialogue without erasing differences.11, 13 Although one’s degree of inclusivity might ultimately
be limited, as our results show, limited inclusivity is sufficient for consensus. In fact, with enough
inclusivity, consensus can become even more likely as more issues get involved — as participants
discuss more issues, they discover more potential areas of agreement, which can then promote
engagement on other issues that they differ on.
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As suggested in the introduction however, consensus may not always lead societies or move-
ments to the truth. Indeed, as our results demonstrate, consensus and convergence to the truth can
sometimes be quite at odds. In particular, the more extreme the truth is, the more likely that any
consensus achieved will be far removed from it. Furthermore, since greater inclusivity promotes
consensus, too much inclusivity, while minimizing fragmentation, may lead to extreme truths be-
ing wholly ignored.
Intriguingly and also importantly, whether this dilemma is concerning may depend on where
one’s opinion already lies. This is because people tend to assume that their own opinion is rela-
tively close to the truth (otherwise, they would not have that opinion). For centrists, who think
the truth is roughly in between most people’s opinions (and therefore have central opinions them-
selves), greater inclusivity is a non-issue, because it promotes consensus at the center, and thus
eventual convergence to where they think the truth is. For moderates, limited inclusivity is help-
ful, but too much will result in convergence of opinions towards a central position that (at least
initially) they think misguided. For radicals, who think the truth is extreme, the dilemma between
truth and consensus is the most pressing of all. Too much inclusivity, and they might end up giv-
ing up on (what they believe to be) hard-won truths. Too little inclusivity, and the fragmentation
might be too strong ever induce social change.
What this implies for the simultaneous pursuit of consensus and truth is uncertain, and fur-
ther research is needed. Tentatively, we suggest taking into account the different strategies of
inclusivity that actors might employ depending on whether they are centrists, moderates, or radi-
cals, along with the fact that inclusivity can change with time. One possible route to consensus at
an extreme truth, for example, might be for nearby radical actors to limit their inclusivity at first,
gathering a strong enough pool of like-minded individuals before increasing their inclusivity and
using their greater numbers to draw moderates and centrists into their cluster. All this assumes,
of course, that radicals on other fringes of the opinion space do not try the same approach.
Nonetheless, it remains the case across scenarios that too little inclusivity can only result in un-
productive fragmentation — so much fragmentation that even if pockets of individuals converge
to the truth, their number will be minuscule. However one balances the trade-off between truth
and consensus then, it is still advisable to avoid exclusivist interaction. If not, people will neither
listen to the truth, nor will they listen to each other.
Collectively, these findings promise great theoretical and practical significance, and are of di-
rect relevance to contemporary political debates. By formalizing intuitive descriptions of how
people might interact with the truth and engage when discussing multiple issues, our work al-
lows opinion dynamics to capture a wide new range of phenomena. The conclusions from our
models can be used to guide how political campaigns (and other relevant processes) run. It also
helps refocus the debate on divisive politics by going beyond simplistic assumptions about multi-
issue dialogue, and turning attention towards the inclusivity of cross-issue interactions instead —
a move we believe will be of substantial benefit to observers and organizers alike.
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